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Abstract 
This study applies a new multi-focal actor-centered institution-theoretic approach to examine the 
association between executive pay and the recruitment of social elites to the board of directors in 
developing countries. We use a sample of 119 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 17 African stock 
markets to model this relationship. The results suggest that a higher proportion of elites on the 
board is associated with lower executive pay. This is moderated by institutional quality; that is, 
lower institutional quality is associated with more directors drawn from social elites and with higher 
pay, while the opposite is true in higher-institutional-quality environments. Our findings confirm 
the importance of the social environment within which governance is embedded. 
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Prior research on the determinants of executive and CEO salary has been overwhelmingly 
dominated by the adoption of either an agency-theoretic or a neoclassical lens. The former focusses 
on incentive alignment between shareholders and their managerial agents (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) as well as insider self-reward or appropriation tendencies (e.g. Doidge et al, 2007). The latter 
focusses on the pay-performance relationship (e.g. Buck et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2014) as well as 
salary premiums attributable to the supply or demand-side schedules of the managerial labor market 
(e.g. Oxelheim & Randoy, 2005). Both assume market-intermediated arms-length transactions and 
third-party contracting in the provision of resources, including capital and labor, to the firm. 
However, there is a lack of research focussing on the role of the underlying political economy in the 
determination of optimal executive salary levels. This is of particular importance in developing 
economies, where firms and their transactions are contextually embedded in institutional 
frameworks that promote extended socially conditioned relational contracting (Acquaah, 2007). 
 We follow North (1989, 1991)’s intuition that, in developing countries with weaker 
aggregate formal institutional quality, polities are demographically narrower and controlled by 
empowered special interest groups, or social elites, with considerable vested private benefits of 
control. These actors have a lack of incentive to initiate more equitable reforms in formal 
institutional frameworks, resulting in stagnation. However, while they usurp hegemonic control 
over the national polity, they are drawn from the underlying society, and in the case of much of the 
developing world this is based on extended clan and ethnic lineage rivalries that in effect form the 
underlying social fabric of emerging nation states. Our model extends the actor-centered institution-
theoretic model of Aguilera & Jackson (2003, 2010) to a developing context. This involves 
considering the inter-relationship between the different stakeholders within the organizational 
structure of the firm, each having socially constructed preferences shaped by the prevailing 
institutional framework within the society from which they are drawn. In this way, our model 
accommodates a firm’s active management of its legitimacy strategy (Suchman, 1995), which leads 
it to co-opt environmental contingencies arising from the demographic shape of polity, through the 
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recruitment of social elites to nonexecutive board roles. This legitimacy is essential in the 
acquisition of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However the recruitment of elites also 
introduces institutionalized incongruities into the firm through a conflict of their socially 
constructed norms and preferences with those of other stakeholders such as management, labor, 
suppliers and customers, these being unequivocally shaped by the underlying clan or ethnic lineage 
governance framework within the society. Following Aguilera & Jackson (2003), we argue that 
salary is a natural mechanism used to stabilize the firm’s governance structure when otherwise 
irreconcilable tensions arise due to institutionalized incongruities between elites and management 
drawn from the underlying informal societal framework. 
 Using a unique sample of 119 initial public offering (IPO) firms from 17 African stock 
markets, we find that elevated proportions of social elites on boards of directors are associated with 
lower average executive salaries. We argue this is due to a tempering effect of all the powerful 
ethnic lineages and extended clan governance frameworks from which all stakeholders are drawn. 
This supports relational contracting and effectively reigns in appropriation motivations associated 
with social elites. Furthermore, this association is positively moderated by formal institutional 
quality. Consequently, in low formal institutional quality environments, higher proportions of social 
elites are associated with higher executive salaries, while the opposite is true in high formal 
institutional quality jurisdictions. Our findings and new theoretical approach yield valuable insights 
into the determinants of executive salaries in developing economies – where national governance 
frameworks can be very different from their counterparts in advanced economies. This also makes a 
valuable contribution to international business theorizing, in terms of underscoring the importance 
of explanations based on the contextual embeddedness of governance arrangements and utilizing 
under-used institution-theoretic approaches as opposed to notions of governance emanating from 
convergence processes and competitive efficiencies at a national level. 
 The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we outline our model and derive the 
theoretically framed arguments underpinning our hypotheses. The following section discusses the 
appropriateness of the African context for this study, explains the characteristics of the sample, 
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describes the structure of the variables used in the estimation and presents some descriptive 
statistics. The estimation results are reported and discussed in section 4, and the final section 
summarizes the conclusions of the paper, lists the limitations of the study and suggests some 
avenues for future research. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
There is a considerable literature on executive and CEO pay, although the overwhelming majority 
of it is informed by a narrow set of theoretical perspectives. Most studies focus on a small group of 
developed nations, principally the US (e.g. Core et al., 2003, 2008), UK (e.g. Conyon & Murphy, 
2000), Japan (e.g. Abe et al., 2005), and Scandinavia (Oxelheim & Randoy, 2005), and this is 
largely the reason for the limited range of theoretical applications, given that these countries all 
have institutional frameworks that extensively support external market intermediation of capital, 
managerial labor and products (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Hoskisson et al., 2004). 
 Neoclassical theory is fundamentally based on notions of efficient markets. For managerial 
labor, this implies the equating of supply of and demand for executive talent (Conyon, 2006). In this 
scenario, the marginal return on executive performance is equal to the marginal product (Mirlees, 
1976). This has led to a host of studies focussing on pay that is related to individual performance 
(e.g. Buck et al., 2008), as well as the association between pay and firm performance (e.g. 
Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Buck et al., 2008; Conyon, 2006). Agency theory extends this 
economic perspective by viewing pay as a form of incentive alignment between shareholder 
principals and their managerial agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This has more recently evolved 
into tournament theory (Conyon et al., 2001; Main et al., 1993), relating to competition in internal 
labor markets, and CEO power theory (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004) that focusses on the self-reward 
tendencies of dominant CEOs. 
 However, a limitation of such neoclassical and agency perspectives regarding pay and 
governance is the exclusive focus on bilateral contracts between principals and agents, since notions 
of agency costs are based solely on differences in utility. While this has been argued to be akin to a 
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form of dyadic reductionalism (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003: 449), it also lacks any consideration of 
the social context within which business activities are embedded. A further limitation of such 
perspectives is their exclusive focus on external market intermediation. This severely curtails their 
application to emerging and developing economies, in which markets tend to be both inactive and 
segmented (see Hearn & Piesse, 2013; Hearn, 2014) and relational contracting is commonplace. 
Ownership structures also differ significantly from the traditional Berle & Means (1932) view of 
diversification as the sole means of achieving separation of ownership from control, which is a 
fundamental condition of agency theory (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003, 2010). Furthermore, agency 
theory has a restricted view on board composition in terms of the board’s ability to monitor. Thus, 
interlocking directorships and the recruitment of directors from other backgrounds, while 
potentially beneficial for the firm, are generally viewed negatively in terms of their “busyness” that 
may inhibit effective monitoring (Fich & Shivdansani, 2006). Conversely, resource dependence 
theory is preoccupied with the social capital and networks that directors bring to the firm in terms of 
additional resources and information, which can be linked to higher performance (e.g. Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Hillman & Dalziel (2003) were the first to provide a theoretical integration of 
resource dependency’s boundary-spanning directors and the incentives of executives, although this 
has not been developed further. 
 A recent study of the political economy related determinants of executive salary in Chinese 
listed firms, by Chizema et al. (2015), utilized social comparison theory where higher numbers of 
government officials as nonexecutives on boards of directors were found to be associated with 
lower executive salaries. Theoretically, the egalitarian nature of socialist government officials co-
opted to boards of directors was argued to exert anti-inflationary pressure on executive self-reward 
tendencies. However, this perspective is very limited in its lack of consideration of the wider 
political economy within which all aspects of the firm’s functioning are inextricably embedded. 
Given these constraints within prior theorizing, we propose an extension of the institutional actor-
centered model of Aguilera & Jackson (2003, 2010). This is sociologically orientated and assumes 
the firm’s organizational structure and boundaries are transcended by a number of distinct 
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stakeholders, each with their own socially constructed preferences. The emphasis on social 
construction of preferences underscores the importance of institutions in forming these, while at the 
same time underlining their importance in shaping overall firm strategy. Aguilera & Jackson’s 
model assumes three principal stakeholder groups, namely those of capital, management and labor. 
These groups are in dynamic coalition and conflict with each other, owing to potential 
institutionalized incongruities, while at same time conceding concessions when conflicts arise 
between capital and management – over the design of management compensation, for example – in 
order to maintain the stability and integrity of the firm as a governance structure. 
The model flexibly accommodates incongruities, deemed to arise through institutionalized 
differences in rationality (Lepsius, 1990). In this way, if capital, as a stakeholder group, takes the 
form of stock market financing through debt and equity claims, and contingent property rights 
emphasise liberalism and protection of minority outsider residual-risk holders, then management’s 
preferences will be congruous through their adoption of performance-contingent compensation 
packages. On the other hand, if capital takes the form of extended interfirm networks – ubiquitous 
in Japan (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) – then, through the “locked-in” commitment arising from the 
social multiplexity of interfirm networks, internal capital markets and relational contracting will be 
preferable. Management compensation is then structured in accordance to social status and 
responsibility, in conjunction with a more socialized definition of property rights. Salary awards are 
comparable to civil service salary scales. This is also mirrored by career trajectories for executives 
that emphasize longevity of service and the acquisition of job-specific skills, with the adoption of a 
distinct company focus (Sidani & Al Ariss, 2014; Sidani & Thornberry, 2009), as opposed to 
transferable skills that facilitate a more open and external labor market (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). 
 Developing economies are often characterized by considerable incongruity between formal 
and informal governance frameworks. This is exhibited by often narrow and control-focussed 
formal institutional architecture, inherited from the European colonial era, that has been assimilated 
into underlying feudal extended clan or ethnic lineage based societies. A further characteristic is 
that national boundaries are representative of the extent of colonial conquest, rather than delimiting 
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the underlying indigenous nation states – that often had their own political, legal dispute resolution 
and economic governance frameworks. North (1989, 1991) argued that demographically narrow 
polities, populated with social elites, inhibit institutional reforms that would lead to a more 
equitable redistribution of wealth and economic opportunities across society. Furthermore, the often 
limited formal institutional architecture transplanted to these nascent states, which formed the basis 
of indigenous polities, were taken under the hegemonic control of select ethnic groups, empowered 
at independence (Joireman, 2004; Kuran, 2009). In effect, this sustains the underlying feudal 
political economy through the capture of the machinery of state, despite the secular, impartial and 
individualistic nature of European institutions (Sidani & Thornberry, 2013). This questions the 
institutionalist distinction between “formal” and “informal” (e.g. North, 1991, 1994), in which 
formal can be viewed as having been superimposed onto informal and, at times, due to the lack of 
legitimacy of formal architecture, informal governance is upheld in preference to the formal 
governance apparatus, owing to extensive decoupling of the rival frameworks. Most importantly, it 
emphasizes the weak nature of formal institutional frameworks and their assimilation within the 
powerful underlying informal governance frameworks based on extended clan and ethnic lineages. 
 There is a considerable recent literature documenting the overwhelming prevalence of 
extended patriarchal clans and ethnic lineages and their dominance in the economies of the Middle 
East and North Africa (e.g. Sidani & Thornberry, 2013; Berger et al., 2015) and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Joireman, 2001, 2004; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Hearn et al., 2016). Sidani & Thornberry 
(2013) argue that clan affiliation is the single most dominant force in nascent Arab states, where 
state architecture and institutions adopt a distinct clan orientation (Berger et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
religious institutions and associated norms and values based on Islamic shari’ya in North Africa 
(Hearn, 2014) and traditional beliefs shaped on Ubuntu philosophy in Sub-Saharan Africa (West, 
2014) emphasize the dominance of the extended family. This is particularly true as the indigenous 
“…African society is a system of mutually benefiting reciprocities” through which exchange within 
extended families takes place (Otite, 1978: 10 quoted in Darley & Blankson, 2008: 377). This forms 
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the basis of our claim that there is an underlying clan-centered institutional framework that 
transcends all other theoretical relationships. 
 
The impact of national political economy on executive pay 
So far, we have considered the structure of indigenous society. This yields two powerful 
sociological constructs: the first is social elites, who themselves are drawn from the underlying clan 
or ethnic system yet at the same time are characterized by their considerable vested interests. The 
second is the all-pervasive clan or ethnic lineage system that acts as the cohesive social fabric 
within society. In this way, stakeholders’ participation within the firm’s organizational structure can 
be thought of as either emanating from the underlying clan-based system or, if they are foreign, 
having to fit in with that system in order to attain legitimacy. Thus, the three stakeholder groups 
identified in Aguilera & Jackson’s model, namely capital, management and labor, can all be viewed 
as being mutually influenced by prevailing clan-based institutions. As such, clan or ethnic-based 
sociological constructs act as a powerful counterbalance against potential incongruities introduced 
into firms from the conflicting priorities and preferences of otherwise very different stakeholder 
groups. 
 However, unlike in Aguilera & Jackson’s actor-centered model, we follow Suchman (1995) 
in arguing that the firm is both an active manager of its legitimacy with external stakeholders, as 
well as being a passive recipient of institutionalized legitimacy concerns emanating from them. The 
latter is exemplified by the firm attaining cognitive legitimacy – through its adoption of extensive 
relational contracting amongst all stakeholder groups which emphasizes its comprehensibility and 
taken-for-granted nature (Suchman, 1995) among indigenous clan-based constituencies. However, 
the firm needs to actively seek moral legitimacy – where it conforms to the norms associated with 
societal expectations regarding its structure (Suchman, 1995) – and pragmatic legitimacy in which it 
actively seeks to exchange and influence legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). This takes the form of the 
co-opting of social elites into its organizational structure through their recruitment as nonexecutive 
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directors. Such co-optation leads the firm to have preferential access to resources and information, 
thereby ensuring its economic survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
 We argue that social allegiances to extended clan or ethnic lineages are of major importance 
in feudal political economies across much of the world, particularly in developing economies. 
These are characterized by closed and internal labor markets and pay determined through complex 
notions of social status. Furthermore, while social elites are important in providing regulatory, and 
to a lesser extent normative, legitimacy, they are inextricably embedded within the deeper clan-
based system inherent in such societies. Thus, while wealth and economic growth may be 
concentrated in the hands of such extended clans, as argued by Fogel (2006), executive pay at the 
firm level is determined by the institutionalized rules of the socialized bureaucracy (Ocasio, 1999) 
of the internal labor market1. Social elites form part of the societies from which they emanate 
(Granovetter, 2005). Consequently, they are best considered not only in terms of their position and 
the institutionalized legitimacy conferred by it, but also in terms of their role in society and the 
underlying clan structure. This is an extension of the singular focus adopted by North (1994), in 
which such elites are considered solely in terms of their elevated position within indigenous polity. 
 Theory (Ocasio, 1999) implies that these strongly socialized norms infuse into the firm and 
shape the informal rules and routines associated with executives, including notions of appropriate 
remuneration. Furthermore, the powerful ubiquitous nature of clan or ethnic affiliation and its 
socialized relational contracting tempers the potentially incompatible preferences of social elites, 
which are shaped by their vested interests arising from their exalted status. Social elites thus impede 
inflationary executive pay awards through the consideration of this powerful and latent underlying 
clan or ethnic affiliation. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Average executive pay is negatively associated with the proportion of social elites on 
the board of directors. 
 
1 It should be noted that our arguments relate only to the executive pay-setting process. We do not discount the 




The moderating influence of institutional quality 
We propose that institutional quality moderates the theoretical association between executive pay 
and the proportion of social elites on the board of directors. This measure implies a range from high 
to low-quality institutional environments. In low-institutional-quality environments, North (1991, 
1994) argues that state architecture is characterized as weak, with narrow, control-orientated 
polities, dominated by a small number of social elites. The latter have considerable state-level 
private benefits and lack any incentive to endorse more equitable institutional reforms that would 
broaden the underlying economy and empower the wider population through greater social 
inclusiveness. Fogel (2006) extends this view by arguing that polities dominated by extended family 
or clan groups concentrate wealth and economic opportunities in the hands of controlling families 
and this has a detrimental impact on institutional reform and societal inequality. Sidani & 
Thornberry (2013) claim that benevolence and patronage towards the wider clan and family 
members leads to what, in the West, is considered nepotism. This intra-clan benevolence, combined 
with notions of mutual co-ownership and extended reciprocity, is argued to underscore more visible 
signs of kickbacks and corruption carried out by individual clan members in empowered, social-
elite positions on behalf of more distant clan members (Sidani & Thornberry, 2013). We argue that 
such behavior is also associated with ineffective monitoring that would otherwise inhibit executive 
self-reward tendencies. The institutional theory of action (e.g. Ocasio, 1999) considers that 
ineffective monitoring and inadequate surveillance of insider executives is reflected in weaknesses 
in the rules and routines associated with their roles. Thus, we argue that, at the lower end of the 
institutional quality spectrum, there will be higher proportions of social elites on boards and the aim 
of the firm will be to gain legitimacy and improve its access to resources. This will lead to higher 
levels of executive pay. 
 We argue that, as institutional quality improves, state architecture becomes more equitable 
and socially inclusive across the wider society (Aoki, 2001). The prevalence of institutional 
frameworks supporting third-party contracting is higher where there is a markedly lower influence 
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of feudal clan-based institutions. Such frameworks also reflect increased costs associated with 
expropriation technologies (Doidge et al., 2007), due to enhanced transparency and improved 
judicial and legal systems. Operational efficiency and profitability is favored over concerns 
regarding institutionalized social legitimacy within firms. This is reflected in both the formal and 
informal institutions in firms, and shapes executives’ rules and routines. The lack of any necessity 
to attain legitimacy in the firm is linked to a lower level of importance being attached to social elites 
within societies characterized by stronger institutional frameworks and broader, more socially 
inclusive, polities. This then leads to a reduced need to co-opt and recruit social elites to boards. 
The greater emphasis on operational efficiency and profitability implies that executive pay will be 
determined more by individual performance and merit, with these norms shaping both the 
institutionalized rules and routines of executive roles (Ocasio, 1999), and notions of appropriate 
salary levels. 
In summary, we argue that theory suggests a role for institutional quality as a moderator of 
the association between social elites on boards and executive pay. Consequently, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher institutional quality moderates the inverse association between the 
proportion of social elites on the board of directors and average executive pay. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the appropriateness of the African context for studying this topic, explain 




A central issue in the African institutional environment relates to the modern national boundaries 
that were drawn to accommodate European colonial ambitions. These frequently conflict with 
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established indigenous African nation states and ethnic groups (Joireman, 2001, 2004). Thus, the 
continent exhibits a sharp divide in formal institutions, between the French and Portuguese civil 
code and English common law, although all states originally established under colonial rule are 
patriarchal in nature (Hearn, 2015). Independence for the majority of African countries happened 
during the 1960s, and this resulted in a transition from an imperial system to local control by 
national social elites from empowered ethnic groups (see North, 1989 for a discussion on Latin 
America). This had a twofold impact. First, social elites were created from distinct ethnic groups, 
with vested interests and an aversion to institutional reform and an equitable allocation of resources. 
Second, large sections of ethnically fragmented societies were disempowered, and the formal 
political, governmental and legal institutions that were introduced had little social legitimacy. In 
addition, there are wide variations in institutional quality across Africa, which, combined with the 
importance of social elites in corporate life, suggests that Africa is an ideal context in which to test 
our model of executive remuneration. 
 
Sample composition 
The sample consists of 119 private-sector firms (state privatizations and joint ventures excluded) 
that underwent IPO on an African stock market between January 2000 and January 2014. The 
choice of IPO firms rather than larger and more established ones was made for two reasons. First, 
managerial labor markets in IPO firms are typically closed due to the overriding influence of the 
founder-entrepreneur and the lack of formal governance structures within such firms (Brav & 
Gompers, 2003). In contrast, older and larger firms often have more bureaucratic procedures for 
determining remuneration, and better-functioning internal labor markets (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). 
Second, IPO firms are largely a product of their indigenous political economies, whilst older firms 
have more deeply engrained bureaucracies and processes. 
 IPOs on 23 African markets were surveyed in the first stage of data collection. These 
markets were Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde Islands, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
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Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. IPO data for Nigeria were only 
available from January 2002 onwards. The data were sourced from national stock exchanges and 
their associated websites, and were cross-checked against lists from major brokerage houses to 
maximize the accuracy of the data. 280 listings were identified. 
 In the second stage, IPO prospectuses were collected from various sources (see Appendix 1 
for details). We focussed on domestic private-sector firms, and include only those in which the IPO 
involved the listing of ordinary shares with single-class voting rights and genuine ownership 
diversification to minority shareholders. We excluded private share placements (involving a 
preferential allocation of stock to corporate or institutional block holders), registrations, 
introductions and secondary offerings such as rights issues that had been erroneously classified as 
IPOs. This reduced the total number of genuine private-sector IPOs to 136. Data were missing in 
several cases and those cases were dropped from the sample. Thus, the final sample consisted of 
119 IPOs from 17 countries (see Table 1). It should be noted that there were few IPOs in the two 
largest African markets, Egypt and South Africa. This is due to concerns over the low levels of 
liquidity in these markets, which result in many firms listing either through private placements, 
introductions or registrations, or through an IPO and private placement undertaken together. 
****** Table 1 about here ***** 
 
There was considerable variation in both the quantity and quality of the information in the 
IPO prospectuses. We also verified all the data from the prospectuses by cross-checking with firm 
websites and with mandatory filings of annual accounts. All financial and balance sheet data were 
converted to US dollars. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was the average cash salary of the executive directors of each firm (SAL). 
Remuneration through stock options or bonuses was not included as such practices are rare in 
developing countries and particularly in Africa. Bonuses were only reported in a handful of firms, 
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and stock options declared in two Moroccan, two Egyptian, and four South African firms. 
Supplementary benefits were sometimes reported, but rarely enumerated. Details of the directors 
and the salary data were sourced from the director profile sections of IPO prospectuses and then 
verified, where possible, from annual reports and the African Financials website. Fees for 
attendance at board meetings (where appropriate) were added to the salary figures. Following Core 
et al. (2003), we used the natural logarithm of the average cash salary (SAL) to minimize the 
possible effects of heteroskedasticity. Detailed definitions for all variables are given in Table 2. 
***** Table 2 about here ***** 
 
Explanatory variables 
The first explanatory variable is the proportion of social elites on the board (ELT). This corresponds 
to Hypothesis 1 as well as forming an integral part of Hypothesis 2. We identified four distinct 
categories of social elite – namely senior military, government, commercial and academic – from 
the inspection of directors’ biographical sections in individual firms’ IPO listing prospectuses. We 
also adopt a one-dimensional definition, whereby an individual director is defined in terms of the 
social elite status described in their director profile within the prospectus. We further verify this 
information from additional sources (see Appendix Table 1). We adopt a mutually exclusive 
definition of directors drawn from one of the four elite backgrounds. However, we concede that it is 
quite possible for a director to fit into a number of categories of elites. For example, a former 
military officer may also have served in the government and had a commercial role. Furthermore, 
the list of four identifiable elites may not be exhaustive but they are based on those reported 
formally in the listing prospectuses, which are contingent on firms’ self-identification of elites 
subject to national regulatory requirements. 
 Military elites (ELTM) are defined as those with positions of admiral, general, brigadier, 
group captain and above in the national army, air force or navy. This is similar to the definition used 
by Peng et al. (2001) in a study of military elites on boards in Thailand. Government elites (ELTG) 
include those with senior civil service appointments, former presidents, prime ministers, and those 
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with diplomatic and ambassadorial roles. This follows Acquaah (2012) and Hillman et al. (2005), 
who study resource provision and social capital brought to boards by politically affiliated 
government directors in Ghana and the US respectively. Commercial elites (ELTC) are defined as 
those with prestigious blue-chip directorships, commercial attaché roles and board-level roles in 
national chambers of commerce. Academic elites (ELTA) are defined as those holding positions of 
professor and above. The aggregate social elites metric is created from the combination of all 
groups, expressed as a proportion of board size. 
 
Moderation variables 
The product of ELT and QUAL forms our moderation variable for Hypothesis 2. This is a measure 
of institutional quality and is constructed from an equally weighted average of six World Bank 
governance metrics (Kaufman et al., 2009). These metrics have been rebased to a 0 – 10 scale. We 
follow Liu et al. (2014) in moderating a variable using an index. In the Liu study, an index was 
generated to capture elements of the institutional environment within which firms are embedded. 
We adopt a similar approach by capturing a broader, aggregate institutional environmental quality 
of the country in which the IPO is undertaken. 
 
Control variables 
We include a number of control variables. First, there are two country-level control variables. We 
control for any direct impact due to variations in the institutional quality (QUAL) variable. Income 
levels vary considerably across these countries and we might expect the salaries of executives to 
reflect these differences. Hence, we include the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (GDP) to 
control for these country-level differences. 
Second, we include a set of four firm-specific control variables. We expect larger firms to 
pay higher salaries to board members because of the increased complexities of the tasks they have 
to undertake and hence the more sophisticated skills they need to possess (Sanders & Carpenter, 
1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). We measure firm size (FSIZ) as the natural logarithm of pre-tax 
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(gross) revenues. We also expect better-performing firms to pay higher salaries. Hence, we include 
the accounting return on assets (ROA) as a measure of firm performance (Finkelstein & Boyd, 
1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2000). The age of the firm (AGE), defined as the natural logarithm of age 
in years, may also have an impact, but the expected direction is unclear. Melkumov et al. (2009) 
argue that younger firms in Russia are less institutionally bound to older governance frameworks 
and thus adopt governance akin to market-orientated Western notions of best practice. Conversely, 
older firms are very much rooted in older institutional governance frameworks. However, such a 
distinguishable difference between “old” and “new” is less clear within a network economy context 
such as Africa. Finally, we control for financial leverage, as we expect higher levels of debt to 
impose greater financial discipline and lead to lower average salary levels. Leverage (LEV) is 
measured as the ratio of debt to total assets, following Bruton et al. (2010). 
Third, we include a set of five board control variables relating to the composition of the 
board of directors. Firms with larger boards should pay lower average salaries as there are more 
directors to cope with the complexities of running the firm, and hence we expect a negative 
relationship between board size (BSIZ) and average salary. In so far as non-executive directors are 
truly independent, they will monitor and limit any self-rewarding tendencies among the directors. 
We would thus expect a negative relationship between the proportion of nonexecutive directors on 
the board (NEX) and the average salary bill. Long-serving directors are likely to become more 
entrenched, and this may have an impact upon their propensity to self-reward. Thus, we measure 
director tenure (TEN) by the average years of board service, and expect this to have a positive 
impact on average salaries. Many African firms are part of business groups (Hearn & Piesse, 2013; 
Hearn, 2014), and their governance is characterized by interlocking directorships across the group 
members. These interlocking constellations of firms form an effective internal group-wide labor 
market, where executive tenure, salary and contractual specifications are in accordance with the 
complex social dynamics within the group. Thus, given the powerful overarching nature of the 
socialized internal group-wide labor market, we would expect a negative relationship between the 
proportion of the board occupied by directors of business-group-affiliated firms (BUS) and average 
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salary. In line with He (2008), we argue that founders serving as CEOs in their IPO firms are less 
likely to seek salary and incentive rewards, where these financial incentives are offset by their 
personal satisfaction (or non-pecuniary private benefits) associated with created the firm initially. 
Thus, we would expect an inverse association between founders serving as CEOs (FD) and average 
salary. Finally, we introduce a binary control for whether the CEO is drawn from a social elite 
background. We would expect a positive association between the CEO being drawn from social 
elites and average executive salary. 
Fourth, we include a set of four ownership control variables. Any IPO involves the previous 
owner diluting some or all of their control in exchange for external capital, and we would expect a 
larger dilution (DIL) to be associated with a greater tendency to self-reward through higher director 
salaries. Higher levels of executive shareholdings (EXEC) serve to align the interests of executives 
and shareholders, and should act as a constraint on self-rewarding tendencies. As noted above, 
block shareholders (BLOC) have both the incentive, because of their significant investments, and 
the authority to mitigate any self-rewarding tendencies on the part of the CEO and other directors. 
Concentrated family retained ownership (FAM) can either exert positive constraining influences on 
self-reward tendencies or encourage higher salary rewards, the distinction being based on family 
motives and intra-family social dynamics. We follow the first argument, assuming concentrated 
family ownership to be inversely associated with average salary. 
 
Methodology 
The model is estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), and includes a set of industry 
controls2 and year controls. Different industries are subject to differing levels of regulation (Sanders 
& Carpenter, 1998), whilst the year controls are necessary because the IPOs take place across 
several years, during which macroeconomic conditions may have changed and during which there 
have been improvements to the regulatory environment. The model is stated as follows: 
 
2 The eight Bloomberg industry categories used are non-cyclical consumer goods, cyclical consumer goods, energy, 














where i are firm-level variables and j country-level variables. FIRMi = the vector of firm-specific 
control variables for firm i, BOARDi = the vector of board control variables for firm i, OWNi  = the 
vector of ownership control variables, INDi = the vector of industry dummies related to firm i, 
YEAR = the vector of year dummies corresponding to the year in which the IPO took place, and 
COUNTRYj = the country cross-section fixed effects. It should be noted that the units of 
observation are the country and the IPO-firm observation, that is, countries form the cross-section 
and IPO-firm observations the vertical dimension of the panel. 
 Our choice of pooled OLS regressions with fixed effects and White-Huber clustering 
methods robust to standard errors and covariances is based on the structural features of the 
underlying data. Firstly, our data is nested between distinct levels, that is at aggregate country-level 
and then at firm-level. This is evident from our dependent variable, our independent variables and 
many of our controls that are based on observations at firm-level, while there are country-level 
observations (such as institutional quality) also included in the model. Clustering based on 
differences between the underlying levels in the data can be resolved by using hierarchical 
multilevel (HLM) linear regressions in Stata. HLM models yield a flexible and dynamic alternative 
to standard OLS modeling, although a significant shortcoming is their potential bias due to their 
inability to capture all unobservable variation, which can be done with OLS fixed effects (Skrondal 
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2010). Multilevel models are also more constrained in their treatment of 
heteroskedasticity and covariances, in contrast to the Huber-White robust methods (Chaplin, 2003) 
used in OLS models in Stata. 
 However, a more serious issue is the extreme skewed clustering of some of the independent 
variables, for example, the ratio of social elites and the four disaggregated components. It is harder 
to control for such deviations, which can lead to potential biases in either multilevel or OLS 
frameworks as both are based on the assumption of independent and identically distributed errors. 
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We follow the salary literature and use pooled OLS models (e.g. He, 2008; Core et al., 2003, 2008) 
with country fixed effects plus Huber-White robust standard errors and covariances. However, in 
addition, we estimate multilevel linear regression models, following Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh 
(2010), as an additional robustness check. We also acknowledge that caution should be applied in 
the statistical interpretation of t-statistics where these both affect standard errors and associated p-
values and statistical confidence in hypothesis testing. Thus, while the absolute sizes and signs of 
the coefficients are expected to conform to best linear unbiased estimates, their t-statistic values are 
likely to be lower than they would otherwise be (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables. The sample of 119 IPO firms comes 
from 17 countries, with Algeria, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Malawi and Zambia each accounting 
for only a single IPO and others accounting for many more. The mean executive pay is US$141,300 
but there is considerable variation around this mean, from a maximum of US$1.2m in Algeria to a 
minimum of US$9,442 in Sierra Leone. Clearly, these variations cannot readily be explained by 
differences in levels of national income or indeed by other macroeconomic variables, or by 
institutional quality, and this is what motivates our interest in this topic. In the full sample, the 
average direct salary is about 65 times the per-capita GDP, but this multiplier varies hugely between 
countries. 
 As noted above, there is considerable difference in institutional quality across the sample. 
Nigeria (29.86) and Algeria (34.24) report the lowest scores, Mauritius (71.55) and Botswana 
(69.09) the highest. Social elites account for 13.08% of directors across the sample, with the 
majority originating from government and commercial backgrounds. We point out that the 
proportions of directors drawn from among the four classes of social elites are particularly high in 
Sierra Leone (80.00%), Zambia (33.33%), Kenya (38.91%), Nigeria (27.58%), Mauritius (27.78%), 
and Namibia (25.60%), although with the caveat that some of these countries report very few IPOs. 
Furthermore, these very unequal distributions of social elites across countries reflect the skewed and 
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unequal distribution of values across the wider sample. It should be noted that a limitation in almost 
all empirical methods is their ability to handle such deviations from assumptions of distributional 
normality. This is particularly true in both multilevel and OLS modeling and underscores the need 
for caution in the interpretation of our empirical results. 
 Table 3 reports the correlations between the variables. They are generally small and lack 
statistical significance, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern. However, to confirm this, 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) were computed, and the values for all variables were found to be 
less than ten. They are not reported but are available from the authors. 
***** Table 3 about here ***** 
 
4. Regression Results 
The regression results are shown in Table 4. Model 1 simply includes the array of general country-
specific, firm-specific, board, and ownership control variables. The within (country) R2 is 0.6273 
while the between (country) R2 is almost negligible at 0.0101. The overall R2 is 0.2201. These 
results alone imply the model has high explanatory power within each country but poor explanatory 
power between countries, the latter in turn leading to a lower overall explanatory power. Most of 
the control variables have the expected signs, but few are statistically significant. This is most likely 
due to the small number of observations and the numerous explanatory variables, which results in 
too few degrees of freedom. Firm size (FSIZ) has a weakly significant (p < 0.10) positive impact on 
executive pay, while a similar association exists with firm performance (ROA). Larger firms 
involve greater complexity, and hence require suitably rewarded executives with the requisite 
talents. They are also associated with higher prestige and social status within smaller developing 
economies, and this leads to more social leverage in terms of higher pay awards. An inverse relation 
exists between three variables – the proportion of independent nonexecutives on the board (NEX), 
the proportion of directors drawn from business groups on the board (BUS) and the founder being 
retained as CEO at IPO – and executive pay, with coefficients only significant at the 90% level (p < 
0.10). While independent nonexecutives are typically associated with monitoring effectiveness, the 
22 
inverse association between business group directors and pay fits with our argument that these 
directors form a constituent part of group-wide managerial labor markets. Salary levels are 
determined through socialized dynamics within the group, which inhibits individual executives’ 
self-reward tendencies or the competitive inflationary pressures on salaries common in external 
labor markets. There is a positive association between concentrated retained ownership by both 
executives (EXEC) and family (FAM), and executive salary, which is statistically weak in both 
cases (p < 0.10). This suggests that higher personal executive ownership is associated with 
increased social leverage and consequently higher pay awards, while families tend to constrain 
executive self-reward tendencies to a lesser extent. These results are robust across all five models. 
Furthermore, as an additional robustness check, we estimated an array of multilevel linear 
regressions using maximum likelihood estimators. The results for all models are in line with the 
findings reported for OLS methods and are not reported here but are available from the authors 
upon request. Interestingly, executive pay does not vary with the average level of per-capita GPD 
(GDP), nor with institutional quality (QUAL), although these effects are similar to those in the main 
models. 
***** Table 4 about here ***** 
 
In model 2, the social elites (ELT) variable is added. This leads to a marginal increase, of 0.65%, in 
the within (country) explanatory power, to an R2 of 0.6338. The between (country) R2 increases by 
0.46% to 0.0147, while the overall R2 increases almost 15.09% to 0.3710. It also leads to a marginal 
decrease in the sum of squared errors (SSE) from 227.93 (model 1) to 223.92 (model 2). It can be 
noted that there is only a minimal decrease in the log likelihood ratio between models 1 and 2, from 
-207.53 (model 1) to -206.47 (model 2). The coefficient on the ELT variable is negative (β1 = -
1.761) and statistically significant (p < 0.05). This provides statistical support for Hypothesis 1. The 
associations between the different categories of control variables and average executive pay are the 
same as in model 1. 
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In model 3, the social elites (ELT) variable and its interaction with institutional quality 
(ELT*QUAL) are added. This leads to a significant improvement in the explanatory power of the 
model and the within (country) R2 increases by almost 10% to 0.6588 while the between (country) 
R2 increases substantially, by almost 24%, to 0.2539. The overall R2 increases by 9% to 0.4616. It 
also leads to a large decrease in the SSE, to 208.64, and a reduction in the log likelihood ratio (-
202.26) compared to the values for both models 1 and 2. The coefficient on the ELT variable is 
positive and statistically significant (β1 = 11.052, p < 0.05), whilst the coefficient on the interaction 
term (ELT*QUAL) is negative and statistically significant (β3 = -28.211, p < 0.05). The control 
variables noted above retain their statistical significance. These results lend support to Hypothesis 2. 
It appears that social elites on the boards of directors of firms in countries with weak institutional 
environments not only provide influence, preferential access and social legitimacy, but also allow 
executives to self-reward through higher salaries. In contrast, the influence of social elites is lower 
in countries with higher-quality institutions, where we would expect to see a greater degree of 
competitive market efficiency in executive pay and the objective of operational efficiency to be 
more important than social legitimacy. These findings are clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which 
shows the expected average executive pay in firms in different institutional contexts (0.3 < QUAL < 
0.7) and with different proportions of social elites on their boards of directors (0 < ELT < 0.3)3. The 
figure shows that, in countries with higher levels of institutional quality, a higher presence of 
nonexecutives drawn from the social elites leads to better monitoring of executive remuneration and 
hence more competitive levels of executive pay. However, in countries with lower levels of 
institutional quality (i.e. those for which QUAL is about 0.35 or less), higher proportions of social 
elites among the nonexecutives on boards of directors simply reinforce the existing social 
relationships and facilitate executive self-reward, and hence higher salaries. 
***** Figure 1 about here ***** 
 
 
3 The proportion of social elites on a board ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of the mean of the proportion of 
social elites (0.13) plus one standard deviation (0.18). 
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We also estimated two further models (models 4 and 5), which are shown in the final two columns 
of Table 4. Model 4 differentiates between the different categories of social elites, and includes 
social elites with military (ELTM), government (ELTG), commercial (ELTC), and academic 
(ELTA) backgrounds separately. This results in a marginal increase in the within (country) R2 of 
approximately 1% to 0.6720 (from the preceding model 3) but a decrease of 2% in the between 
(country) R2, to 0.2378. The overall R2 is 0.4678. The SSE is also the lowest of all the models, at 
200.58, while the log-likelihoods are the lowest of all the models. The coefficients on both the 
underlying and moderating terms on military (ELTM) and academic (ELTA) elites are extremely 
high in comparison to the other elite categories. Given that these two categories of elite are 
extremely skewed and clustered within the sample, as is shown by the descriptive statistics in Table 
1, we argue that these overly high coefficient estimates are a reflection of non-normality and the 
violation of the distributional assumptions central to the models. Consequently, we re-estimated the 
model omitting military and academic elites, in model 5, and only included government (ELTG) 
and commercial (ELTC) elites. This led to only a minor increase in the SSE (222.24) and log-
likelihood (-202.99), and a decrease in the within (country) R2 of approximately 1.5% to 0.6546 
(compared to model 4) and in the between (country) R2 of almost 4% to 0.1932. However, this is 
offset by a substantial increase in the overall R2 of 0.4834. The underlying and moderating 
coefficients are more stable for government elites (7.139) and government elites moderated by 
institutional quality (-20.887), with both statistically significant (p < 0.10). 
 We carried out two final robustness checks. The first was a re-estimation of the models on a 
smaller sample comprised of the markets with more than three IPOs during the period, to address 
concerns over the time-clustering of observations. However, the results were not qualitatively 
different from those of the full sample. The second was to configure an array of equivalent 
multilevel linear regressions using maximum likelihood estimation4. The results were essentially the 
same as those in Table 4 and are not reported here for brevity but are available from the authors. 
 
4 These regressions maintained all the parameters of our OLS models, but in place of OLS fixed country effects, they 
used a configuration of random intercept and slope parameters based on the levels within the data. Our data consisted of 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has examined the determinants of executive pay using a multi-country sample of IPO 
firms listed on African stock markets. We have used both the institutional theory of action (Ocasio, 
1999) and the actor-centered multi-focal, institution-theoretic perspective proposed by Aguilera & 
Jackson (2003, 2010). This captures the incongruity between formal and informal institutions and 
the mutual co-existence of rival governance frameworks within a single national setting, following 
Aguilera & Jackson (2003, 2010). The institutional theory of action states that the hierarchical 
bureaucratic organizational control structure of a firm is shaped by influences from formal and 
informal institutions, and these infuse into the firm from a socially embedded context (c.f. 
Granovetter, 2005). Thus, while formal institutions that arise from national regulatory and 
normative frameworks shape the rules and routines associated with executive roles, informal 
institutions also influence the norms within the firm and the degree to which executives adhere to 
formalized organizational structures. In the same way, informal institutions determine notions of 
appropriateness. For example, they inhibit or constrain executive self-reward tendencies over pay. 
By considering the social context within which firms are embedded, we have adopted a framework 
with which we can extend the insights of the institutional theory of action. 
 We have considered a heterogeneous sample of African countries, all of which are based on 
feudal-clan political economies, whose communitarian institutions are offset to varying degrees by 
the contrasting adoption and assimilation of European formal institutional frameworks. The 
dominant control over national regulatory institutions underscores a formal governance system 
based on individual firms’ environmental co-optation of contingencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
This necessitates the strategic recruitment of social elites to board-level positions, which provides 
them with access to resources and information through their enhanced institutional legitimacy and 
recognition (Suchman, 1995). However, such social elites on boards are also affiliated to 
 
two levels, namely country and firm. We experimented to find the model of best fit based on log-likelihood ratios and 
stability of the coefficient estimates.  
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empowered clans, families or tribal groups in these economies, and this constrains executive self-
reward tendencies within the extensive socialized extended clan system. Therefore, on the one hand 
firms are more likely to recruit higher proportions of their boards from among social elites, while on 
the other executive salaries are lower. 
The empirical results support this theoretical prediction. Our findings are similar to those of 
Chizema et al. (2015), who used a similar empirical design but one based on social comparison 
theory and the impact of board political connections on the average executive salary in Chinese 
listed firms. Political connectivity in China’s case refers to the communist party, which is argued to 
have socialized bureaucratic notions of equality as well as viewing executive decision making as a 
way to implement government-determined goals. We argue that our findings are based on an 
institution-theoretic approach that effectively encompasses the social comparison perspective, 
according to which institutions are infused into every aspect of individual perceptions of reality and 
rationality. However, an important caveat in our study is that our arguments relate to the pay-setting 
process that arises through a socialized bureaucracy. Thus, we avoid making any inferences about 
the impact of such extended clan groups in terms of exacerbating expropriation and economic 
inequality, as highlighted by Fogel (2006). It is also worth noting that Aguilera & Jackson (2003) 
and Hoskisson et al. (2004) both conducted comparative studies between the US and the essentially 
feudal, clan-based economy of Japan. In this context, managerial labor markets are fundamentally 
closed and internal in nature, with executive salaries determined through a complex socialized 
bureaucracy. Both studies argue that executive pay is commonly lower in Japan than in the US as a 
result of the pervasive influence of socialized clan-based norms. 
 Finally, we argue that the association between social elites on firm boards and executive pay 
is moderated by institutional quality. Specifically, in low-institutional-quality contexts, social elites 
have concentrated state-level private benefits of control based on their empowered position in 
demographically narrow polities. In this institutional context, firms are more likely to co-opt elites 
to their boards to attain institutionalized legitimacy and, in consequence, preferential access to 
resources and information, thereby alleviating environmental contingencies. However, it is 
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important not to overlook the fact that, while social elites have considerable empowerment, they are 
also affiliated to dominant clan, tribal or ethnic lineages that underscore the fabric of indigenous 
societies. While we consider this an important latent factor that underpins the social context within 
which firms are inextricably embedded, the notions of reciprocity and mutual, extended co-
ownership of assets increase the likelihood that such elites will engage in visible signs of wealth 
transfer or corruption (Sidani & Thornberry, 2013). We argue that such behavior can take the form 
of ineffective monitoring and an inherent weakness in the execution of formal rules and routines 
within the firm. Thus, executive self-reward tendencies are exacerbated rather than curbed. 
Higher institutional quality results in less incongruity being infused across firm boundaries 
and shaping the rules and routines associated with internal bureaucratic organizational structure. In 
particular, higher institutional quality implies the prevalence of increasingly sophisticated third-
party contracting within the wider economy, while the polity is more demographically inclusive of 
the broader population. This, in turn, means there is significantly less incongruity in national 
governance frameworks and more successful adoption and assimilation of formal institutions in the 
societal matrix. This suggests a greater emphasis on operational efficiency and profitability, rather 
than the institutional legitimacy that follows from the recruitment of social elites in lower-
institutional-quality environments. These characteristics reduce the need for social elites on boards, 
and lead to executive pay being determined by ideas around individual merit and performance. 
Thus, higher pay is associated with fewer social elites on the board when there is higher 
institutional quality. 
These arguments have been supported by our empirical analysis, with elites from 
government or commercial backgrounds shown to be the most influential. The existing empirical 
literature on the determinants of executive pay uses data on firms from single, developed 
economies. In contrast, our sample of 119 firms comes from 17 African economies with very 
diverse levels of economic development and institutional quality. This has enabled us to take a 
novel approach and combine empirical analysis and theory in an explanation of executive pay. This 
is the first study to explicitly consider the influence of the underlying feudal clan institutions within 
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which firms are embedded in many emerging and developing countries. Our theoretical model 
provides a manner in which to analyze aspects of internal governance structures and the formal and 
informal controls in the firm. In this way, it marks an important departure from much of the salary 
literature, in which frameworks are typically agency-based. 
 The implications of our findings are important. We show the influence of the underlying 
political economy within which firms are socially embedded to be a central determinant of 
executive pay. Informal governance frameworks across the overwhelming majority of developing 
and emerging economies, as well as many developed economies, are based on extended-clan-based 
feudal systems. Affiliation to dominant clan, extended familial or ethnic groups characterizes the 
institutional frameworks of many nascent nation states. Firms embedded within these frameworks 
often recruit elites to their boards due to their social connections, in order to facilitate access to 
resources and co-opt their environmental contingencies. However, such elites, as well as the firms 
and executives within them, are typically affiliated or socially connected to dominant clans. This is 
particularly evident in Africa, where shareholdings are frequently tied up in dense systems of cross-
shareholding networks and pyramiding, while directors’ socialization and interlocks infuse control. 
These network economies have closed managerial labor markets and internal salary-setting 
processes based on bureaucracy and social status. 
For investors and regulators, a major contribution of our study is the emphasis on 
institutional quality. It is important to differentiate between low-institutional-quality environments 
in which the social elites on boards of directors are associated with higher self-reward tendencies, 
and high-institutional-quality environments in which the converse is the case. Therefore, potential 
investors would be wise to identify other mechanisms for monitoring and controlling executives in 
contexts of low institutional quality. This is especially necessary for those who have previously 
confined their investments to higher-quality institutional environments. 
 Clearly, our study has several limitations. The sample size was small, and the controls 
necessary to counter the heterogeneous nature of the countries involved presented us with inevitable 
problems with respect to the degrees of freedom. This affected the statistical significance of some 
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explanatory variables. Our sample was restricted to IPO firms listing on African markets. This 
choice was made because the prospectuses (that are a legal requirement prior to IPO) contain 
considerable amounts of information that would not be transparent at any other time. IPOs are not 
very common in Africa and moving to other regions of the world would expand this coverage 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Firms 
Details of private-sector (state privatization and joint ventures excluded) IPO firms: average executive salary in US$ 
‘000; the average proportion of directors on the board who are social elite non-executives (%); the percentage 
institutional quality (equally weighted mean of six World Bank governance indicators (http://www.govindicators.org)); 
and GDP per capita (US$) for each country. The last line (Total) is the sum across all IPOs in the first data column, and 
the average values for the sample in the subsequent columns. 
 










social elites on 








North Africa      
Egypt 6 131.79 12.86 42.74 1,370.76 
Morocco 32 94.49 5.08 47.14 2,122.86 
Tunisia 22 59.99 1.52 50.48 3,659.23 
Algeria 1 1,224.00 14.29 34.24 3,143.63 
      
East Africa      
Kenya 5 443.14 38.91 39.45 568.85 
Mauritius 3 70.95 27.78 71.55 5,992.36 
Tanzania 1 104.52 16.67 44.98 466.37 
      
West Africa      
Nigeria 20 221.14 27.58 29.72 841.57 
Cote d’Ivoire 2 247.44 0.00 33.79 948.26 
Ghana 10 25.31 14.28 53.37 540.49 
Cape Verde Islands 1 25.80 0.00 58.59 2,030.66 
Sierra Leone 1 9.44 80.00 38.56 435.41 
      
Southern Africa      
Botswana 6 268.42 17.68 69.09 5,567.07 
Malawi 1 18.48 14.29 48.94 235.92 
Zambia 1 34.15 33.33 47.34 668.64 
Namibia 2 103.76 25.60 61.84 3,944.32 
South Africa 5 297.29 12.67 61.36 5,372.25 





Table 2: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable definitions and the expected association between each independent and the dependent variable (+/-). All 
variables are from IPO listing prospectuses in the first instance, with additional sources outlined. 
 
Variable Definition Expected 
impact 
Dependent variable  
SAL Natural logarithm of the average executive cash salary. This is expressed in US$.  
   
Explanatory variables  
ELT Ratio of the total number of non-executives drawn from senior military, government, commercial 
and university backgrounds divided by board size. Sourced from combination of director profiles in 
IPO listings prospectuses and indigenous sources outlined in Appendix Table 1. 
- 
ELTM Ratio of the total number of non-executives drawn from senior military backgrounds divided by 
board size. Senior is defined as at or above the level of admiral, general, brigadier and group 
captain in national navy, army, and air force. Sourced as for ELT 
- 
ELTG Ratio of the total number of non-executives drawn from senior government backgrounds divided by 
board size. Senior is defined as at or above the level of president, prime minister, diplomatic and 
ambassadorial positions. Sourced as for ELT 
- 
ELTC Ratio of the total number of non-executives drawn from senior commercial backgrounds divided by 
board size. Senior is defined as at or above the level of prestigious blue-chip directorships, 
commercial attaché roles and board level roles in national chambers of commerce. Sourced as for 
ELT 
- 
ELTA Ratio of the total number of non-executives drawn from senior commercial backgrounds divided by 
board size. Senior is defined as at or above the level of professor Sourced as for ELT 
- 
   
Country-level control variables  
QUAL This measure of institutional quality is constructed from an equally weighted average of six World 
Bank governance metrics (Kaufman et al., 2009). These six have been rebased to a 0 – 10 scale. 
These were downloaded from http://www.govindicators.org 
- 
GDP Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP is in US$ at constant 2000 prices. Sourced from World 
Bank 
+ 
   
Firm-specific control variables  
FSIZE Natural logarithm of pre-tax revenues in pre-IPO year. Revenues are measured in US$000. Sourced 
direct from IPO listings prospectuses as well as from Al-Zawya, national stock exchanges, and 
www.AfricanFinancials.com 
+ 
ROA Accounting return on assets (ROA) is defined as (Net Income/ Total Assets) owing to frequent 
omission of taxation and interest income from listing prospectuses and filings. It is more commonly 
(e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 2000) defined as ((Net income + interest*(1 – tax rate))/ total assets). 
However, interest income and corporate taxation rates are frequently omitted from listings 
prospectuses in Africa 
+ 
AGE Natural logarithm of firm age – measured in years from IPO year to year of establishment of firm. +/- 
LEV Ratio of total debt liabilities to total asset size of firm. Asset size is inclusive of tangible and 
intangible assets. Debt is inclusive of short and long term interest bearing liabilities. Both are 
sourced from IPO listing prospectuses or annual reports at time of listing and expressed in US$. 
_ 
   
Board control variables  
BSIZE The total number of directors on board – including both executives and non-executives. - 
NEX Ratio of independent non-executives – unaffiliated to any inside group within firm or CEO – to 
board size. 
- 
TEN Natural logarithm of average executive tenure (expressed in years). + 
BUS Ratio of non-executives affiliated to same business group as the focal firm to total board size. - 
CEOFD Binary dummy taking value 1 if founder is CEO and 0 otherwise - 
CEOELT Binary dummy taking value 1 if CEO is drawn from social elite background and 0 otherwise + 
   
Ownership control variables  
DIL Ratio of shares offered at IPO to total shares issued and outstanding in firm post-IPO. + 
EXEC Percentage ownership of executive director’s post-IPO. - 
BLOC Percentage ownership of aggregate block shareholders post-IPO. Block shareholders include 
Business Angels, Venture Capitalists, Corporate block entities. 
- 
FAM Percentage ownership of family post-IPO  
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Pearson correlations. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 Variable Mean SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 SAL 10.751 2.532  1.000         
2 QUAL 0.137 0.186  -0.097 1.000        
3 ELT 7.468 0.800  0.009 -0.324*** 1.000       
4 GDP 0.471 0.111  -0.163 -0.189* 0.625*** 1.000      
5 FSIZ 4.337 0.852  0.362*** -0.037 0.174* -0.029 1.000     
6 ROA 0.109 0.157  0.172* 0.015 0.098 0.104 0.055 1.000    
7 AGE 1.246 0.418  0.090 -0.181* -0.028 -0.055 0.289*** -0.137† 1.000   
8 LEV 0.636 0.956  0.100 0.066 0.026 -0.115 0.071 0.430*** -0.095 1.000  
9 BSIZ 2.174 0.390  0.059 -0.090 0.140† -0.119† 0.239*** -0.235 0.315*** 0.137† 1.000 
10 NEX 0.236 0.239  -0.009 0.139† 0.006 0.250*** 0.136† 0.062 -0.098 0.022 -0.222** 
11 TEN 0.550 1.042  0.045 -0.173* -0.107 -0.134† 0.065 0.024 0.304*** -0.064 -0.052 
12 BUS 0.265 0.369  -0.003 -0.141† 0.110 -0.084 0.174* -0.068 0.020 0.112 0.194* 
13 CEOFD 0.496 0.502  -0.146 0.005 -0.070 -0.130† -0.159* 0.149* -0.377*** 0.087 -0.086 
14 CEOELT 0.160 0.368  0.151* 0.325*** -0.229** -0.240*** -0.068 0.131† -0.170* 0.224*** 0.002 
15 DIL 0.330 0.217  -0.065 0.255*** -0.292*** -0.178* -0.155* 0.086 -0.056 0.062 -0.081 
16 EXEC 16.595 24.373  0.019 0.154* -0.050 0.090 -0.137† 0.104*** -0.248*** -0.067 -0.308*** 
17 BLOC 7.656 17.356  0.067 0.049 -0.003 0.203* -0.005 -0.075 0.032 -0.020 -0.120† 
18 FAM 30.075 32.650  -0.019 -0.310*** 0.190* -0.017 0.084 0.103 0.098 0.064 0.119† 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.005 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix continued 
 
 Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 SAL          
2 QUAL          
3 ELT          
4 GDP          
5 FSIZ          
6 ROA          
7 AGE          
8 LEV          
9 BSIZ          
10 NEX 1.000         
11 TEN -0.103 1.000        
12 BUS -0.305*** -0.053 1.000       
13 CEOFD -0.054 0.161* -0.004 1.000      
14 CEOELT -0.163* 0.042 -0.061 0.164* 1.000     
15 DIL 0.164* -0.193* -0.213** -0.034 0.084 1.000    
16 EXEC 0.076 0.066 -0.282*** 0.359*** 0.107 0.048 1.000   
17 BLOC 0.314*** -0.179* -0.225** -0.299*** -0.068 -0.031 -0.214** 1.000  
18 FAM -0.317*** 0.224** 0.553*** 0.206* -0.078 -0.317*** -0.298*** -0.399*** 1.000 




Table 4. Empirical Resultsa, b, c 
OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of average executive salary (SAL). All 
independent and control variables are defined in Table 2. 
 
 Dependent variable: SAL    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 4.131 [0.07] 9.954 [0.14] 4.131 [0.06] 4.544 [0.09] 4.544 [0.09] 
Explanatory variables      
H1: ELT -- -- -1.761 [-1.78]* 11.052 [1.79]* -- -- -- -- 
H2: ELT x QUAL -- -- -- -- -28.211 [-1.93]* -- -- -- -- 
      
ELTM -- -- -- -- -- -- 28.293 [1.53] † -- -- 
ELTM x QUAL -- -- -- -- -- -- -47.865 [-1.34] † -- -- 
ELTG -- -- -- -- -- -- 5.646 [1.11] 7.139 [1.39] † 
ELTG x QUAL -- -- -- -- -- -- -18.316 [-1.37] † -20.887 [-1.42] † 
ELTC -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.939 [-0.50] 0.570 [0.11] 
ELTC x QUAL -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.138 [-0.18] -8.212 [-0.73] 
ELTA -- -- -- -- -- -- 25.503 [3.58]*** -- -- 
ELTA x QUAL -- -- -- -- -- -- -72.572 [-3.65]*** -- -- 
      
Country-level controls      
GDP -2.829 [-0.26] -1.720 [-0.16] -0.687 [-0.07] -0.538 [-0.08] 0.334 [0.04] 
QUAL 3.471 [0.17] 3.882 [0.20] -1.794 [-0.11] -3.251 [-0.18] -1.998 [-0.12] 
      
Firm-specific controls      
FSIZ 0.954 [1.64] † 0.971 [1.69]* 1.091 [1.76]* 1.071 [1.41] † 1.090 [1.51] † 
ROA 1.457 [1.37] † 1.724 [1.30] † 2.921 [1.78]* 3.023 [2.74]*** 2.869 [2.24]* 
AGE -0.466 [-1.09] -0.502 [-1.28] † -0.321 [-0.70] -0.555 [-1.32] † -0.426 [-0.82] 
LEV -0.750 [-1.04] -0.449 [-0.62] -0.404 [-0.74] -0.365 [-0.66] -0.364 [-0.63] 
      
Board controls      
BSIZ 0.310 [0.45] 0.419 [0.63] 0.096 [0.17] 0.381 [0.69] 0.285 [0.54] 
NEX -1.505 [-1.44] † -1.658 [-1.62] † -1.032 [-1.29] † -0.979 [-1.37] † -1.610 [-1.61] † 
TEN -0.238 [-0.74] -0.279 [-0.89] -0.282 [-0.86] -0.259 [-0.73] -0.351 [-1.05] 
BUS -0.500 [-1.38] † -0.487 [-1.52] † -0.801 [-1.45] † -0.92 [-1.39] † -0.754 [-1.47] † 
CEOFD -0.584 [-1.33] † -0.693 [-1.49] † -0.711 [-2.08]* -0.999 [-2.67]*** -0.810 [-2.33]** 
CEOELT 0.606 [0.86] 0.802 [1.33] † 0.884 [1.41] † 1.086 [1.97]* 0.929 [1.71]* 
      
Ownership controls      
DIL -1.008 [-1.19] -0.792 [-0.91] -0.857 [-1.29] † -1.695 [-1.41] -0.671 [-0.76] 
EXEC 0.016 [1.44] † 0.018 [1.53] † 0.019 [1.65] † 0.019 [1.54] † 0.021 [1.74]* 
BLOC -0.005 [-0.38] -0.001 [-0.09] -0.006 [-0.41] -0.004 [-0.25] -0.001 [-0.06] 
FAM 0.012 [1.36] † 0.011 [1.38] † 0.015 [1.32] † 0.013 [1.39] † 0.014 [1.54] † 
      
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 
F-test 2.96 [0.00] 2.92 [0.00] 3.12 [0.00] 2.60 [0.00] 2.82 [0.00] 
Log-likelihood -207.53 -206.47 -202.26 -199.92 -202.99 
SSE 227.93 223.92 208.64 200.58 211.24 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.350 2.283 2.185 2.345 2.151 
Within R2 0.6273 0.6338 0.6588 0.6720 0.6546 
Between R2 0.0101 0.0147 0.2539 0.2378 0.1932 
Overall R2 0.2201 0.3710 0.4616 0.4678 0.4834 
a Industry, country and time (year) fixed effects included in all models but not reported; b t-statistics are in 
parentheses; c Stata’s Huber (1967) and White (1980) clustering by country cross sections 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.005 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
 
Market Information source 
North Africa Databases: Al Zawya (see website at: http://www.zawya.com/); Mubasher investment reporting 
(http://www.mubasher.net/en/Index.aspx); Bloomberg LLP; Business Week 
  
Algeria Websites: Bourse d'Algérie [SGBV] (htp://www.sgbv.dz); Commission d'Organisation et des 
Surveillance des Opérations de Bourse [COSOB] (http://www.cosob.org/) 
Telephone interviews and direct correspondence: M. Hamdi and Mme. Haffar (Bourse d’Alger) 
  
Egypt Websites: Egyptian Stock Exchange [EGX] (http://www.egx.com.eg/english/homepage.aspx); 
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(http://www.efsa.gov.eg/content/IFIE/about_efsa.html); Central Bank of Egypt 
(http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/) 
Telephone interviews (unstructured) to obtain data: Mohammed Omran (Chairman, EGX) 
Cairo-based interviews: Ayman Raafat (Market Control, EGX); Hebatallah El Serafi (Research & 
Market Development, EGX); Yasmin El-Khatib (PR & Communications, EGX) 
  
Morocco Websites: Bourse de Casablanca (http://www.casablanca-bourse.com/); Le Conseil Déontologique 
des Valeurs Mobilières [CDVM] (http://www.cdvm.gov.ma/) 
Casablanca-based interviews to obtain data: Mme. Meryem Tazi (Chef de Produits, Service 
Marketing, Bourse de Casablanca); Mme. Amina Zouaoui (Analyste, Service Négociation, Bourse de 
Casablanca) 
  
Tunisia Websites: Bourse de Tunis (http://www.bvmt.com.tn/); Conseil du Marché Financier [CMF] 
(http://www.cmf.org.tn/); Central Bank of Tunisia (http://www.bct.gov.tn/) 
Tunis-based interviews: M. Hatem Zribi (Direction de la Promotion du Marché, Bourse de Tunis); 
Mme. Maher Chtourou (Banque Centrale de Tunisie library) 




Databases: African financials annual reports (http://www.africanfinancials.com/); Invest Africa 
annual reports (http://investinginafrica.net/african-stock-markets/); Thomson Perfect Information 
portal; Bloomberg LLP; Business Week 
 
East Africa  
Kenya Websites: Nairobi securities exchange (https://www.nse.co.ke/); Capital Markets Authority Kenya 
(http://www.cma.or.ke/); Daily Nation business journal (http://www.nation.co.ke/) 
Local Nairobi-based interviews: Public relations officer, Nairobi Stock Exchange; Investment 
Manager, Suntra Investment Bank, Kenya 
  
Mauritius Websites: Stock Exchange of Mauritius [SEM] (http://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/) 
  
Seychelles Websites: Trop-X Seychelles stock exchange (http://www.trop-x.com/) 
  
Tanzania Websites: Dar Es Salaam stock exchange (http://www.dse.co.tz/) 
Telephone procurement of listing prospectus from M. Stimali, Tanzania Tea Packers Ltd 
  
Rwanda Websites: Rwanda stock exchange (http://rse.rw/); Capital Market Authority (http://cma.rw/) 
  
Uganda Websites: Uganda securities exchange [USE] (http://www.use.or.ug/); Capital Markets Authority 
(http://www.cmauganda.co.ug/) 
Procurement of annual reports: Kampala-based USE library 
Kampala-based interviews: Investment Management team, Crane Bank, Kampala; Head of trading, 
USE trading floor, Kampala; Investment Manager, African Alliance Securities, Kampala; Head of 
equities trading, Standard Chartered Bank, Kampala 
West Africa  
Nigeria Websites: Nigerian stock exchange [NSE] (http://www.nse.com.ng/Pages/default.aspx); Securities 
and Exchange Commission Nigeria (http://www.sec.gov.ng/) 
Lagos-based procurement of annual reports and listings prospectuses from NSE library, Lagos 
Lagos-based interviews: M. Obaseki (President of Operations, NSE); Mme. Hauwa M. Audu 
(Founder CEO, Amyn Investments and stockbroking, Lagos) 
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Cote d’Ivoire Websites: BRVM main site (http://www.brvm.org) 
Cote d’Ivoire:  
Procurement of annual reports: Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire)-based library for BRVM 
Abidjan-based interviews: 
BRVM exchange: Emmanuel Zamble (Market operations manager, BRVM); Khassim Diop (Chargée 
de développement du Marché, BRVM); Abdoulaye Sogoba (Assistant chargée de la formation, 
BRVM) 
Abidjan brokers: M. Auguste Kouakou (Gniman-Finance SA, Abidjan); M. Hermann Boua (Hudson 
et Cie, Abidjan) 
Mali: Bamako-based interviews: M. Amadou Djeri Bocoum (Directeur de l’Antenne Nationale de 
Bourse du Mali, Bamako); M. Alassane Sissoko (Responsable des études et de la négociation, 
Société de Gestion et d'Intermédiation (SGI) du Mali SA, Bamako) 
  
Ghana Websites: Ghana stock exchange (http://www.gse.com.gh/) 
Accra-based interviews: 
Ghana stock exchange: Worlanyo Amoa (Senior Manager, Research and Product Devlopment, GSE) 
Ghana Brokers: Armah I. J. Akotey (Vice President, Databank Brokerage and Investment Banking, 
Accra, Ghana); Edem Akpenyo (HFC Brokerage Services, Accra, Ghana); Kafui Asare (Head of 
Client Relations, SAS Investment Management, Accra, Ghana); Haruna Gariba (Head of Client 
Relations, Merchant Bank of Ghana Ltd, Accra, Ghana) 
  
Cameroon Websites: Doula stock exchange (http://www.douala-stock-exchange.com/) 
  
Cape Verde Islands Website: Cape Verde stock exchange [BVC] (http://www.bvc.cv/) 
Telephone based interviews and procurement of data: Edmilson Mendonça (Operations Manager, 
BVC); Ronnie Machado (Compliance Manager, BVC) 
  
Sierra Leone Telephone-based interviews and procurement of data: M. Gibrilla Sesay (Operations Manager, Sierra 
Leone stock exchange); M. Michael Collier (Deputy President, Rokel Commercial Bank, Freetown, 
Sierra Leone); Jacob Kanu and Daniel Thomas (CEO’s of independent local licensed stockbrokers, 
Freetown) 
 
Southern Africa  
Botswana Website: Botswana stock exchange [BSE] (http://www.bse.co.bw/) 
Telephone interviews and data procurement: Kopane Bolokwe (Operations officer, BSE) 
Gabarone-based interviews with Head of Operations, BSE; President of Stock Brokers Botswana 
  
Malawi Websites: Malawi stock exchange [MSE] (http://www.mse.co.mw/); The Nation business journal 
(http://mwnation.com/) 
  
Zambia Websites: Lusaka stock exchange [LuSE] (http://www.luse.co.zm/); The Post business journal 
(Zambia) (http://www.postzambia.com/) 
Telephone-based procurement: Mme. Sitali Mugala (Operations Manager, Lusaka stock exchange) 
Lusaka-based interviews: LuSE operations personnel 
  
Namibia Websites: Namibia stock exchange [NSX] (http://nsx.com.na/) 
Windhoek-based data procurement from NSX building and library 
Telephone based procurement: John Mandy (CEO, NSX); Loide Nakanduungile (Research Manager, 
NSX); Manda Steynberg (Operations Manager, NSX) 
  
Mozambique Websites: Bolsa de Valores de Maputo [BVM] (http://www.bvm.co.mz/) 
Maputo-based interviews: Señor Bruno Tembe (Técnico Superior, BVM); Señor Felisberto Navalha 
(Operations Manager, Central Bank of Mozambique) 
Maputo-based procurement from Central Bank of Mozambique annex library, Baixa, Maputo 
  
South Africa Websites: Johannesburg stock exchange [JSE] (https://www.jse.co.za/) 
 
